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THE POISON PILL IN JAPAN: THE MISSING
INFRASTRUCTURE
Ronald J. Gilson*
January, 2004

I. INTRODUCTION
The coming of hostile takeovers to Japan has been anticipated, and
anticipated, and anticipated. Each report of a reduction in the size of
crossholdings among Japanese companies and in the size of Japanese
bank stockholdings in their clients has given rise to an expectation that
now, at last, hostile offers would emerge. It is not surprising that
commentators looked forward, optimistically, to the arrival of a
potentially disruptive takeover technique. The extended Japanese
recession, together with management resistance to internally
implemented restructurings and the barriers to externally imposed
restructurings, has created the potential for substantial private and
social gain from rationalizing production. Curtis Milhaupt reports that
as of 2000, thirteen percent of the Tokyo Stock Exchange nonfinancial firms traded at below their liquidation value,1 a phenomenon
that in the United States led to a wave of bust-up hostile takeovers
during the 1980s.2 Nonetheless, in Japan the much anticipated hostile
takeovers did not materialize. In turn, the absence of takeovers
resulted in little clamor for defensive tactics: without a threat on the
horizon, no demand for protection developed.
A number of events now suggest that the long wait for hostile
transactions in Japan may be approaching its end. First, Japanese
*

Marc & Eva Stern Professor of Law and Business, Columbia Law School, and
Charles J. Meyers Professor of Law and Business, Stanford Law School. This article
was originally delivered as a lecture in the Symposium on Hostile M&A and the
Poison Pill in Japan: Prospects and Policy, sponsored by the Columbia Law School
Center for Japanese Legal Studies and the firm of Mori, Hamada & Matsumoto, and
retains some of the informality of that format. I note in particular my gratitude to
Mori, Hamada & Matsumoto for their hospitality during my visit to Japan for this
Symposium, and to Hideki Kanda, Satoshi Kawai and Curtis Milhaupt for helpful
comments on an earlier draft of this article.
1
Curtis J. Mihaupt, A Lost Decade for Japanese Corporate Governance
Reform?: What’s Changed, What Hasn’t, and Why, in INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN
JAPAN: WHY IT HAPPENS, WHY IT DOESN’T (Magnus Blomstrom & Sumner La Croix
eds., forthcoming 2004).
2
RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF
CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS ch.9.E (2d ed. 1995); Ronald J. Gilson, The Political
Ecology of Takeovers: Thoughts on Harmonizing the European Corporate
Governance Environment, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 161 (1992).

corporate law has been extensively amended since the early 1990s to
make the structure of corporate governance more flexible and to
enhance the potential for meaningful monitoring of management. For
example, merger procedures have been simplified; a system for
employee stock option compensation has been established; the
creation of a holding company system through spinoffs has been
legalized and facilitated; companies have been given the option of
adopting a U.S. style board committee-based governance system as an
alternative to the traditional statutory auditor system; and filing fees
for derivative litigation have been reduced, resulting in a ten-fold
increase in derivative litigation.3
Second, a small amount of hostile activity has actually occurred.
In 2000 and 2002, M&A Consulting, a Japanese takeover firm,
initiated control contests directed at Japanese firms: in 2000 a hostile
bid for Shoei Corporation, a real estate and electronic parts company,
and in 2002 a proxy fight over dividend policy at Tokyo Style.4 Both
failed, “in large part because banks and institutional investors gave
unconditional support to existing management when the unwelcome
bidder appeared,”5 just as they have in the past. Other efforts, but now
by foreign bidders, have proven more successful. In 2000, the
management of International Digital Communications (“IDC”), a
midsized Japanese telephone company, accepted a stock swap with
Nippon Telephone and Telegraph Corp. Britain’s Cable & Wireless
then made an uninvited competing bid offering slightly more cash
than the value of the Nippon stock that IDC shareholders would
receive under the transaction IDC management favored. IDC
shareholders voted to accept the uninvited Cable & Wireless bid.6
Also in 2000, Boehringer Ingelheim, a German pharmaceutical
company made an unsolicited offer for the Japanese SS
3

Curtis Milhaupt details the pace and scope of corporate law reform. See
Milhaupt, A Lost Decade, supra note 1; Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mark D. West,
Institutional Change and M&A in Japan: Diversity through Deals, in GLOBAL
MARKETS, DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS: CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE IN A NEW
ERA OF CROSS-BORDER DEALS 295 (Curtis J. Milhaupt ed., 2003)
4
See Milhaupt, A Lost Decade, supra note 1.
5
Milhaupt, A Lost Decade, supra note 1.
6
Robert G. Wray, Japan: The Next M&A Frontier, THE M&A LAWYER, March
2001.
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Pharmaceuticals (“SSP”). Boehringer succeeded in increasing its SSP
holdings from approximately twenty percent to thirty-six percent,
which amounted to a blocking position, and thereby gave the German
company effective control.7
Third, informed observers, whose professional practices depend
upon that status, are now sending a clear signal. They seem to be
acting, rather than simply talking, as if these events actually herald the
coming of Japanese hostile takeovers. Professor Milhaupt reports that
“many investment banks are no longer discouraging foreign clients
from hostile bids, and large numbers of Japanese managers are
seeking professional advice on defensive matters.”8 Of course, supply
typically follows demand, and law firms now trumpet the belief that
changes in the Commercial Code make poison pills possible in Japan.9
It is this last point—the coming of the poison pill to Japan—on
which I focus on here. I have expressed the view that the broad
sanction of the poison pill in the United States has been a mistake.10
The opposing view, effectively championed by Martin Lipton, the
poison pill’s architect, is that the pill ultimately did not discourage
hostile takeovers because courts came to play a mediating role that
gave target boards the ability to secure a better price but in the end did
not often lead boards to finally block an offer.11 While I will take up
7

Id.; see Milhaupt, A Lost Decade, supra note 1, at 11.
Milhaupt & West, Institutional Change, supra note 3, at 322.
9
It is beyond my ambitions here to track the critical Commercial Code changes
that appear to validate a poison pill and the alternative forms that a Japanese poison
pill might take. I note only that the fact that Japanese poison pills would differ
formally from their U.S. progenitor, demonstrates the importance of functional as
opposed to formal convergence of corporate governance practices. See Ronald J.
Gilson, Globalization of Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function,
49 AM. J. COMP. L. 329 (2001). For assessments of the pill structures allowed by the
Commercial Code changes, see Satoshi Kawai, Poison Pill in Japan, 2004 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. , this issue, Arthur M. Mitchell, The Poison Pill Comes to Japan–Part 1,
THE METROPOLITAN CORPORATE COUNSEL, March 2002, at 1, and Arthur M. Mitchell,
The Poison Pill Comes to Japan–Part II, THE METROPOLITAN CORPORATE COUNSEL,
April 2002, at 1.
10
For recent expressions, see Ronald J. Gilson, Unocal Fifteen Years Later, 26
DEL. J. CORP. L. 491 (2001); Ronald J. Gilson, Lipton & Rowe’s Apologia for
Delaware: A Short Reply, 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 37 (2002).
11
See Martin Lipton & Paul K. Rowe, Pills, Polls and Professors: A Reply to
Professor Gilson, 27 J. CORP. L. 1 (2002); Martin Lipton, Pills, Polls and Professors
Redux, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037 (2002).
8
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the claim that experience has rendered the pill benign in the United
States,12 the stakes are much higher in Japan than they were in the
United States. The combination of crossholdings, bank holdings and
governmental stasis that has frozen Japanese corporate governance
leaves hostile takeovers as one of the few external mechanisms for
systemic change that existing institutions do not block or at least
greatly impede. Most important, the institutional infrastructure that
ultimately reduced the defensive impact of the poison pill in the
United States does not now exist in Japan. Thus, the poison pill has
the potential to be greatly more pernicious in Japan than it has been in
the United States, both because of the absence of ameliorating
institutions in Japan, and because the impact is likely to be greater
because in Japan the forces for change in industrial organization
outside the market for corporate control are significantly less strong
than in the U.S.13
My assessment of the coming of the poison pill in Japan proceeds
as follows. Part II lays the groundwork for the analysis by putting
hostile takeovers, a quintessentially U.S. phenomenon, in an
international and functional context. Part III takes up the general
problem posed by defensive tactics and Part IV considers which
participants in the corporate governance structure police the operation
of the poison pill in the U.S. Part V then evaluates the implications of
the U.S. experience for the development of the poison pill in Japan.
Part VI concludes.

II. HOSTILE TAKEOVERS: THE INTERNATIONAL AND
FUNCTIONAL CONTEXT
While the 1980s hostile takeover wave in the United States was
viewed with horror outside the U.S. and U.K., international attitudes
toward hostile takeovers have changed markedly in recent years. The
change is most apparent in Europe. At the time when hostile
takeovers emerged most forcefully in the U.S., the European attitude
toward takeovers was extremely negative. In 1988, the CEO of
Deutsche Bank offered a German view: hostile takeovers were the

12
13

See infra text accompanying note 46-48.
See Milhaupt & West, Institutional Change, supra note 3, at 308-10.
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“blunders of American capitalism.”14 The following year, François
Mitterand, the President of the French Republic, described takeovers
as “gangsterism and the law of the strongest.”15
By 2001, European opinion had shifted dramatically. In June 2001
the proposed Thirteenth Directive on takeovers that had emerged
through the conciliation process reflected a central pro-takeover
theme; following the British City Code on Takeovers,16 the Directive
prohibited target boards from taking any defensive action that
interfered with the shareholders ability to accept a hostile offer.17
Surprisingly, the agreed upon text was defeated in the European
Parliament by a tie vote, but the overall professional sentiment did not
seem to change. Following the Parliament’s deadlock, a “High Level
Group of Company Law Experts,” whose creation was promised to
Parliament during the conciliation process to consider a number of
issues left unresolved in the proposed Directive, was named and its
charge extended to making a more general statement of what should
be the Thirteenth Directive’s operative principles. From the High
Level Group’s report, a revised directive would be crafted.
The High Level Group Report is a remarkable document. First, it
demonstrates clearly how much the European attitude toward
takeovers had changed. The Report’s central concern was not the
legitimacy of defensive tactics—that matter had been resolved in favor
of shareholder choice.18 Rather, the focus is on the structural barriers

14
Ernst-Ludwig Von Thadden, On the Efficiency of the Market for Corporate
Control, 43 KYKLOS 635, 635 (1990), citing FRANKFURTER ALLEGMEINE ZEITUNG,
Dec. 23, 1988.
15
Id., citing LE MONDE, Feb. 14, 1989
16
The full text of the City Code is available at www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk.
17
Proposed Thirteenth Directive 0n Company Law, Article 9, COM Doc. (95)
655 2.7.1996, OJC16/25, revised in COM Doc (97) 565 2.7.1996, OJ 378/10. This
proposal was ultimately rejected by the European Parliament. The current proopsal,
which maintains this position, was proopsed in February 2002. Doc.COM (2002)
534, 2.10.2002.
18
The Report affirmed the principle of shareholder choice: target shareholder
approval was required before the target could take “any action which may result in the
frustration of the bid . . . notably before the issuance of shares which may result in a
lasting impediment to the offeror obtaining control.” Indeed, the Report would not
credit shareholder approval of the creation of a poison pill unless it came after the
hostile takeover offer occurred. Jaap W. Winter et al., Report of the High Level
Group of Company Law Experts on Issues Related to Takeover Bids in the European
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to takeovers in individual countries that prevent a level playing field
within Europe for hostile takeovers. Companies organized in
countries without a tradition of protective governance structures such
as dual class common stock, voting caps, or the right of special classes
of shareholders to name the directors, are at a substantial
disadvantage. Companies organized in countries with protective
structures can make hostile offers for companies organized in
countries without them, but would be protected against hostile offers
directed at them.
The High Level Group Report responds to the level playing field
problem by proposing a “break through principle” that invalidates
barriers to the exercise of voting control by the holder of a majority of
the equity interests after a bidder acquires 75 percent of the equity of
the target company (regardless of voting power), in effect limiting
multiple voting rights to two to one.19 Note that the High Level
Report is dramatically more protakeover than the most favorable
reading of U.S. takeover law, which would leave in place structural
control devices that either predate a public offering or were approved
by shareholders. Thus, at least professional opinion and the opinion of
the European Commission, had come a long way since 1988.
So what changed? The key is understanding that corporate
acquisitions function as an equilibrating mechanism. From this
perspective, acquisitions are an important mechanism for economic
change and hold out the promise of facilitating the particular
economic change of greatest interest to the European Market—the
creation of a single market.
To see this, think of a simple two period model.20 In period one,
the economy is in organizational equilibrium. All assets are owned by
the entity that can most effectively use them, conditional on existing
organizational and industrial technology, on the politically dictated
regulatory regime, and on the transaction costs of shifting the use of
the assets either by moving them between entities or altering their use
Union (Jan. 10, 2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=315322 [hereinafter HIGH
LEVEL GROUP REPORT]. In the U.S., of course, a poison pill can be created before any
offer is made and without shareholder approval. See Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc.,
500 A.2d 1346 (Del.1985).
19
High Level Group Report, supra note 18.
20
This discussion draws on Gilson, Political Ecology, supra note 2, at 163-64.
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within an entity. Between periods one and two, a change in
technology occurs that alters the most efficient distribution of assets.
For example, the change may be scientific, creating economies of
scope between two previously unrelated technologies, or it may be
political, creating economies of scale as a result of a reduction in
regulatory barriers to cross-border trade, or it may be transactional,
reducing the cost of transferring assets between corporations by
creating a new financing vehicle like junk bonds. Corporate
acquisitions occur in period two as the market for assets responds to
the shift in the efficient boundary of the firm. The idea is simply a
market response to changes that implicate organizational form.
From this perspective, the market for corporate control is an
equilibrating process that reallocates ownership of assets following a
change in technology to the entity that then values them most highly.
Hostile takeovers play a special role in this equilibration. Sometimes
target management may resist the equilibration process. Part of the
problem results from a good faith difference in views. For example,
when the destabilizing change is industry wide, it may be particularly
difficult to recognize its implications from inside the industry.21 But
part of the problem also results from the fact that even efficient
change creates dislocation. Target management is typically replaced,
target facilities are often closed, and levels of employment may be
affected. Hostile takeovers are at best Kaldor-Hicks, rather than
Pareto efficient, and target management typically will be among the
losers. Thus, resistance to equilibration is hardly surprising.
From this perspective, the change in European attitudes toward
hostile takeovers is understandable. The expansion of the internal
market, together with growing globalization, altered the efficient scale
in many industries. Hostile takeovers have the potential to accomplish
the necessary reallocation of assets without the delay and political
posturing associated with government action.
The same potential helps explain the perennial expectation that
hostile takeovers are about to come to Japan. Describing the lengthy
Japanese recession, the Wall Street Journal recently reported that “a
combination of ineffectual government and feeble corporaterestructuring efforts snuffed out growth, which has averaged just 1.1%

21

See Randall Mark et al., Alternative Mechanisms for Corporate Control, 79
AM. ECON. REV. 842 (1989).
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annually in the past 11 years.”22 Thus, an assessment of defensive
tactics generally, and poison pills in particular, should appropriately
focus on whether they impede hostile takeovers from invigorating the
equilibration process in Japan.

III. THE PROBLEM OF DEFENSIVE TACTICS
The recent amendments to the Commercial Code that make
technically possible a poison pill—a device that, whatever its
particular form, functions to substantially dilute a hostile bidder’s
holdings if the bidder’s holdings exceed a triggering percentage—only
frames the question of whether the poison pill will function to prevent
hostile takeovers from playing an important equilibrating role. Most
simply, the amendments do not themselves address the obligations of
the board when a hostile bid is actually made. The bidder will
condition its offer on the target board redeeming the pill to avoid the
dilution that would result from the offer’s closing. Can the board
simply decline to disarm the pill and thereby prevent shareholders
from ever having the opportunity to accept or reject the bid? Because
a poison pill is only the most effective defensive tactic, answering this
question requires understanding the role of defensive tactics generally.
Whenever we observe a target firm deploying a defensive tactic,
one or more of three motives will be present. First, target
management may be acting out of self-interest. Whether motivated by
keeping their own jobs or by protecting other stakeholders from the
costs imposed by economic change, target management may try to
preserve the status quo despite the fact that the shareholders would be
best served by being allowed to accept the hostile offer.
Second, target management may be acting as the shareholders’
bargaining agent. In this case, management is using defensive tactics
to negotiate a higher price from the hostile bidder or to seek out a
more favorable competitive bid.
Finally, target management may be using defensive tactics to
influence the timing of the corporation’s acquisition. Management
may genuinely believe that selling the corporation at this time is not in
the shareholders’ interest and, critically, that shareholders will make
22

Sebastian Moffett & Phred Dvorak, After Long Decline, Japan’s Economy is
Stirring to Life, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 2003, at A1.
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the wrong decision even if management explains its views.23 While
the short run effect of defensive tactics undertaken for this reason is
the same as with defensive tactics undertaken for self-serving
reasons—the offer is defeated if the defensive tactics are successful—
in this case the motivation is different: the managers believe they are
acting to maximize shareholder value.
The fact that defensive tactics may have different motivations
poses two central questions at the heart of assessing the potential
impact of the poison pill. Most important, how is the process policed
so that defensive tactics motivated by management self-interest are
never allowed, defensive tactics motivated by an effort to secure the
best price for shareholders are always allowed,24 and defensive tactics
motivated by a timing claim are carefully evaluated to prevent claims
of timing from cloaking self-interested behavior? The critical
operational question is the identity of the policeman.
As I have developed elsewhere,25 the initial debate in the United
States was driven by two interest groups who advanced diametrically
opposite views. Takeover defense lawyers argued that board
decisions with respect to tender offers should be treated like any other
board decision concerning an acquisition proposal: the business
judgment rule should operate to allocate the decision to deploy
defensive tactics, including whether to adopt or redeem a pill, to the
target board.26 Academics, in contrast, advanced the view that tender
offers are themselves an important corporate governance device,
23
See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Intermediate Standard
for Defensive Tactics: Is There Substance to the Proportionality Review?, 44 BUS.
LAW. 247 (1989) (developing the concept of substantive coercion to cover
circumstances when shareholders will reject management’s advice even though
management is right).
24
While the appropriateness of this behavior seems self-evident now, in early
years it was the subject of significant debate. Compare Ronald J. Gilson, Seeking
Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offer Defense, 35 STAN. L. REV. 51
(1982), and Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers:
A Reply and Extension, 35 STAN. L. REV. 23 (1982), with Frank H. Easterbrook &
Daniel R. Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1
(1982).
25
See Gilson, Unocal, supra note 10.
26
This view was most effectively advanced by Martin Lipton. For the classic
formulation, see Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom, 35 BUS.
LAW. 101 (1979).

9

central to acquisitions operating as an equilibrating process. Efficient
equilibration requires that shareholders make the ultimate decision
concerning whether a hostile bid will succeed.27 Interestingly, the two
sides did agree on one important thing: “courts should not determine
the outcome of the largest business transactions in history.”28
In the end, it was the court’s role to decide who would police
management’s conduct in a hostile takeover.29 Not surprisingly, they
chose themselves despite the preferences of academics and
practitioners. Since 1985, Delaware law has dictated that, in the end,
the courts would decide whether a board decision not to redeem a
poison pill would be credited.30 While I have been critical of how the
Delaware courts, especially the Delaware Supreme Court, have
implemented the obligation they took on in the face of skepticism
from both the bar and the academy, the impact of that rather poor
performance has been more benign than the Delaware Supreme
Court’s rhetoric might lead one to expect. Even Martin Lipton, the
poison pill’s architect and a forceful expositor of the view that the pill
gives the target the right to “just say no” to a hostile bid, recently
stated: “[T]he incidence of a target’s actually saying ‘never’ [to a
hostile bid] is so rare as not to be a real-world problem.”31 As I will
27

See Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case
Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819 (1981); Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in
Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981); Lucian Arye Bebchuk,
The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1028 (1982).
28
Gilson, Unocal, supra note 10, at 496.
29
Chancellor Chandler puts the issue more felicitously: “Corporate law seeks to
balance the rights of the owners (shareholders) and the duties of management (officers
and directors). Much of this balance is achieved by imposing fiduciary duties on
management while granting only limited rights to shareholder to participate in
business operations.” William B. Chandler III, this issue. Maintaining that balance,
in this view, is the role of the courts. I note that this view is not without cost.
Particularly with respect to takeovers, if the balance point announced by the court is
not clearly observable to those structuring transactions, then the judicial role becomes
that of Delphic oracle. This is not an easy job for judges, and results in, from my
perspective, the cardinal judicial sin: doctrine that makes transaction planning harder
rather than easier.
30
See Gilson, Unocal, supra note 10, at 496-97 (discussing Delaware Supreme
Court decisions in Household International and Unocal).
31
Lipton, supra note 11, at 1065.
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stress in Part III.C., I believe Lipton’s assessment understates the
poison pill’s continuing impact; however, I agree that the result has
been better than one could have feared. Thus, assessing the impact of
the Commercial Code amendments that now make the pill possible in
Japan requires understanding the infrastructure in the United States
that prevented the pill from operating according to its formal terms.
On its face the pill authorizes the board to invoke a poison pill to
block a hostile takeover and thus to create a serious barrier to the
operation of the market for corporate control. Something outside the
pill itself—and therefore outside the Commercial Code amendments—
prevented the pill from achieving its destructive potential.

IV. WHO POLICES THE PILL IN THE U.S.?
As we have seen, three different institutions—independent
directors, shareholders, and the courts—have the capacity to police the
actual operation of the poison pill to prevent it from being used to
preserve management’s position, and to assess management’s good
faith belief about the right time to sell the company. A critical feature
of the infrastructure that constrained the operation of the poison pill in
the United States is that all three institutions performed that function.

A. Independent Directors
Independent directors are the first barrier to the use of a poison pill
to block, as opposed to negotiate, a hostile takeover bid. Three
changes over the years since the Delaware Supreme Court sanctioned
the poison pill32 have catalyzed the role of independent directors as a
constraint on management self-interest in responding to a hostile
takeover bid.
First, independent directors increased in both number and degree
of independence. Long before Sarbanes-Oxley and the new stock
exchange rules on independence, most large U.S. public corporations
had a majority of outside, non-employee directors. At the same time,
outside directors came to be more independent. Directors who did
business with the corporation as supplier or professional adviser gave
way to directors who had no financial ties to the corporation.

32

Moran v. Household Int’l. Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
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Second, the Delaware courts articulated a clear normative
statement about the role that independent directors should play in
evaluating a hostile takeover bid. Independent directors, the courts
stated pointedly, are not merely advisors to management with no stake
in the outcome when confronted with a hostile bid. In the takeover
area, courts came to expect independent directors to be the real
decision makers and “to be the controlling parties in a target
company’s conduct of its defense. Only when the directors appear to
have abdicated their role to management —think of Van Gorkom,
Macmillan, and QVC—will the court intervene.”33
Finally, public opinion and the opinions of independent directors
changed concerning hostile takeovers themselves. As the gains that
result from hostile takeover driven restructuring became widely
understood, the structure of executive compensation changed in a
fashion that reduced management resistance to takeovers. So long as
management compensation had a relatively small equity component,
entrenchment was a value maximizing strategy for management—a
hostile takeover that benefited shareholders by paying them a
premium for their shares did not benefit managers, who lost their jobs.
During the period in which hostile takeovers became a fixture of the
U.S. corporate landscape, the portion of managerial compensation that
was equity based increased markedly. From 1980 to 1994, equitybased compensation as a percentage of total CEO compensation
increased from twenty percent to almost fifty percent.34 The shift to
equity-based compensation accelerated in the 1994 to 2001 period,
with option-based compensation more than doubling over that
period.35 The result was to align the incentives of management and
shareholders with respect to company operations generally, but
especially respect to takeovers; a premium offer benefited both.36
33

Gilson, Unocal, supra note 10, at 512 (citations omitted).
Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, Are CEOs Really Paid Like
Bureaucrats?, 112 Q. J. ECON. 653 (1998).
35
Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, Stock Options for Undiversified Executives,
33 J. ACCT. & ECON. 3 (2002).
36
While explaining what went wrong with U.S. governance as we approached
the turn of the century is far beyond my ambitions here, I note that it is textbook
economics that an increase in the intensity of management incentives requires a
corresponding increase in the intensity of monitoring of their performance. See PAUL
34

12

Thus, independent directors came to understand that they were to
be the central decision makers in dealing with a hostile offer and to
recognize that hostile takeovers were part of the proper functioning of
the capital market rather than an attack on the corporate citadel. The
circle was closed by a shift in the form of management compensation
that reduced the pressure on outside directors by reducing the financial
threat hostile takeovers posed to management. As a result, both
directors and management were less likely to use poison pill as an
entrenchment device as opposed to a bargaining tool.

B. Courts
The story of the Delaware court’s development of the law of
hostile takeovers is too long and tortured to be recounted here.37 A
fair reading of that path provides some support for Martin Lipton’s
assessment that target boards in the end have not often used the pill to
block a hostile bid.
Despite the Delaware Supreme Court’s
frustratingly fuzzy and inconsistent rhetoric, the chancery court’s
decisions still fairly suggest that the validity of defensive tactics will
be independently assessed, even if one cannot avoid the intuition that
the opinions are rhetorically camouflaged for the benefit of the
supreme court. Management justification of efforts to block a hostile
bid based on a claim that the stock market undervalues the
corporation’s shares or that shareholders will be confused by the offer
will typically, but not uniformly, evoke judicial inquiry into the source
of those problems. Perhaps most important, the courts have clarified
one critical premise: the touchstone for decision is shareholder value.
This does not mean that other stakeholders are unimportant, but only
that their importance is viewed through the prism of equity value.38
As Chancellor Chandler points out, this constrains, but does not
eliminate managerial discretion;39 stakeholder concern can still
MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION, AND MANAGEMENT ch.6
(1992). This did not happen.
37
The early doctrinal history is developed in GILSON & BLACK, supra note 2, ch
15 ; the more recent history is recounted in Gilson, Unocal, supra note 10. Chancellor
Chandler’s contribution to this Symposium presents a nuanced account of the story
from the perspective of the courts. Chandler, supra note 29.
38
See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del.
1986).
39
Chandler, supra note 29..
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surface through management claims of a long run strategy not
appreciated by the market
Thus, despite the Delaware Supreme Court’s rhetorical deference
to director power to deploy defensive tactics, the chancery court
continued to make factually rich assessments of whether target boards
were using the pill to negotiate or to entrench,40 surely emboldened by
the fact that the Delaware Supreme Court has yet, now more than
fifteen years after validating the poison pill, to directly address
whether a target board of directors can simply decline to redeem a
poison pill based on the belief that the company is worth more. On
balance, the Delaware courts have constrained the mischief that the
poison pill could have caused.41

C. The Shareholders and the Market
Independent of legal rules, institutional investors have come to
impose a market constraint on a target’s ability to use the poison pill
to block a takeover bid. The simple fact is that institutions hold a
large percentage, often a majority, of the stock of publicly traded U.S.
companies. While it is commonplace to note the importance of the
large public pension funds, like the California Public Employees
Retirement System and TIAA-CREF, large mutual funds also hold
very large positions. For example, FMR, the adviser to the Fidelity
family of mutual funds, alone holds stakes of five percent or more in
288 of the largest 1000 American public corporation in 2000 and
2001.42 Although less voca;ly than the public pension funds, large
mutual funds also have come to oppose the use of poison pills without
shareholder approval. Fidelity’s voting policies state:
If, without shareholder approval, a company’s Board of
Directors has instituted a new poison pill plan, extended an
existing plan, or adopted a new plan upon the expiration of an

40
The Chancery Court opinion in Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293
(2000) is a clear example of this phenomenon.
41
To be sure, as I have urged elsewhere, it would have been better if the
Supreme Court had actually played the role it gave itself in Household International,
but it could have been worse too.
42
Gerald F. Davis & Mina Yoo, The Shrinking World of the Large US
Corporation: Common Ownership and Board Ties, 1990-2001 (June 2003).
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existing plan during the last year, we generally withhold
votes on the election of directors at the Annual Meeting
following such action.
Fidelity may vote in favor of a rights plan with “sunset”
provisions: if the plan is linked to a business strategy that
will—in our view—likely result in greater value for
shareholders, if the term is less than five years, and if
shareholder approval is required to reinstate the expired plan
or adopt a new plan at the end of this term. . . .
We generally support shareholder resolutions requesting that
shareholders be given the opportunity to vote on the adoption
of rights plans.43

Other large fund families, like Vanguard, take similar positions.
Large shareholder antipathy to a target company’s ability to use a
poison pill to block a hostile bid favored by shareholders operates to
very substantially limit target management’s ability to block a hostile
bid out of self-interest. For those companies that do not have
staggered boards, which still includes more than forty percent of U.S.
public companies,44 a proxy contest to replace directors who decline
to redeem a poison pill in fact may operate more quickly than a
judicial challenge to the board’s action even with more shareholder
oriented judicial review; the process of evaluating alternative
strategies and seeking alternatives to the bid, allowed under even the
chancery court’s most pro-stockholder formulation, still allows delay
that could easily run six or more months. And even where staggered
boards are in place, a strategy of disregarding the views of a majority

43

Summary of Proxy Voting Guidelines, http://personal.fidelity.com (last visited
Nov. 13, 2003). There is evidence that poison pills are most effective when coupled
with a staggered board because the board structure prevents an immediate proxy fight
to replace the board in favor of directors who will redeem the poison pill. See Lucian
Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful Antitakeover
Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887
(2002). Fidelity’s voting policies also dictate votes in favor of proposals to eliminate
staggered boards.
44
Bebchuk et al., supra note 43, at 896.
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of shareholders, while lawful when stated out of context,45 is hardly
attractive as a matter of investor relations.
___________
In summary, the U.S. experience has been that a poison pill has
not frequently blocked a hostile bid, once made, from being
considered by the shareholders. The pill will give target management
who oppose the bid time to explain its position, to negotiate with the
hostile bidder, or to develop an alternative strategy or bidder. Three
critical corporate governance institutions—independent directors, the
Delaware courts, and the capital market—combine to cause the pill to
operate largely as a negotiating tool, rather than as a means to
maintain company independence.
Without this institutional
infrastructure, however, it is a fair assessment that the poison pill
would have materially interfered with the equilibration process that
the United States experienced during the 1980s and early 1990s.
Despite this appraisalt of the poison pill’s impact in operation, it is
important not to overstate just how benign the pill turned out to be. In
this respect, two qualifications are especially important. First, when
coupled with a staggered board, the pill is an effective defense, and
the empirical evidence suggests that in this context the pill has
allowed management in an economically significant number of cases
to prevent shareholders from making a decision about whether to
accept a hostile bid.46 Second, we simply do not know whether courts
now would allow a target corporation to decline to redeem a poison
pill in the face of the kind of offer that played a significant role in the
1980s equilibration process: a junk bond financed bust-up offer made
by takeover entrepreneurs whose strategy is to sell the parts of the
company to more efficient users of the target’s assets. Because such a
bid contemplates a major change in corporate strategy, may involve
forms of payment that are more difficult to value, and may be made by
individuals who are not part of the business mainstream, it is difficult
for the courts, and I expect for the target directors, to sort out

45

See TW Services, Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶
94,334 (Del. Ch. 1989) (Board not required to redeem a poison pill even though
eighty-eight percent of the target shareholders have tendered their shares).
46
Bebchuk et al., supra note 43.

16

management’s actual motive for resisting the offer. It is in this
circumstance that a clearer standard—like the chancery court’s
position before Time-Warner that, after a target board has had the time
to explain, negotiate and seek out another bidder, the shareholders
have the chance to accept or reject the bid47—is a better outcome.
And it is in this circumstance, likely of real economic importance
because of the need for outsiders to make the kind of changes that are
difficult for insiders to see and where the transaction functions most
plainly as an equilibrating mechanism, that the pill may still be a
serious economic problem.48

V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE U.S. EXPERIENCE FOR THE
POISON PILL IN JAPAN
The United States experience can provide some guidance for how
Japan deals with the Commercial Code’s authorization of a poison
pill. To be sure, there are important limits on the relevance of the
American experience to Japan. Japanese industrial organization and
Japanese corporate governance differs markedly from that of the
United States, which surely limits the extent to which the U.S.
experience is transferable. Nonetheless, poison pills are a U.S.
phenomenon, so it is the only source of experience that is available.
Thus, while remaining attentive to the difficulties of generalizing from
a single country’s experience in the face of important inter-country
differences, we have to take guidance from wherever we find it albeit,
with a grain (or pillar) of salt.
The first, and most important point is hardly limited to the pill.
Allowing the capital market to operate as a mechanism to force
corporations to respond to external environmental change is an
important macroeconomic factor. It is especially important when
other change inducing mechanisms, most notably government, may
not only be ineffective, but may be affirmative barriers to change. In
this setting, the role of institutional infrastructure to cabin the
operation of the pill somewhere short of its capacity is critical.
This argument, of course, is not economics, but political economy.
Mancur Olson famously predicted that interest groups with stakes in
the current structures of economic organization will act to preserve the
47
48

See City Capital Assocs. v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988).
I am grateful to Steve Fraidin for his repeated reminders of this point.
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status quo and the size of their piece of the pie even if their actions
actually reduce the overall size of the pie.49 Thus, it may be
politically naïve to imagine that those who favor the status quo will be
unable to prevent a reduction in the pill’s effectiveness. Certainly the
experience in the United States, especially at the state level, counsels
that politics played an important role in setting the policy with respect
to defensive tactics.50
The second point is that the pill has “worked” in the United
States—that is, it has been largely but not exclusively used to support
seeking a better deal for the shareholders rather than simply to block a
bid—because independent directors, courts, and active institutional
investors have all combined to police the uses to which the pill
actually is put. The next step, then, is to assess what institutions can
play that ameliorating role in Japan.
Here the courts win by default. Traditional Japanese corporate
governance does not contemplate independent directors of the
character that has proven so important in the operation of the poison
pill in the U.S. And while recent Commercial Code amendments
allow Japanese corporations to elect a U.S. style governance structure
with outside directors staffing governance committees, there is reason
to be skeptical of the impact of the change. First, Japanese corporate
law does not require an “outside” director to be independent in the
sense that term is used in the U.S.51 Second, early reports suggest a
limited response to the invitation to adopt a U.S. governance structure.
As of mid-June, only thirty-six listed Japanese companies had

49

See MACUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS: ECONOMIC GROWTH,
STAGFLATION, AND SOCIAL RIGIDITIES (1982).
50
In this respect, it likely has been beneficial that Delaware’s race, whether to
the top or the bottom, has been with the Federal government, not with other states.
See Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003); GILSON &
BLACK, supra note 2, ch.23.
51

See Japanese Commercial Code art.. 188. The distinction between
“outside” as defined by the commercial Codeand “independent” directors as
contemplated under U.S. law is discussed in Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J.
Milhaupt, Choice as Regulatory Reform: The Case of Japanese Corporate
Governance, working paper (January 2004).
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committed to adopting the new governance structure.52 Even for that
group, the U.S. experience strongly suggests that the effectiveness of
independent directors depends on a shared vision of their function that
is both situational and requires time to develop.
We can thus expect that the burden of assuring the sensible
operation of the poison pill will fall to the Japanese courts, just as it
did to the Delaware courts. And it would be a serious mistake to
underestimate the weight of that burden. Because the Commercial
Code amendments that now allow a poison pill in Japan are technical
rather than substantive, the Japanese court will be operating without
legislative guidance. Thus it will be up to the courts to write, through
the accretion of judicial decisions, a poison pill “code” that will give
transaction planners for both bidders and targets guidance concerning
the operational rules of a Japanese market for corporate control. This
was the mantle that the Delaware courts took up more than fifteen
years ago, and which they have yet to fully discharge; most starkly,
we still do not know whether a target board, whose reason for
blocking an offer is simply that the shareholders may disagree with the
board over the company’s “fundamental value” or the appropriate time
to sell the company, may block the offer by declining to redeem a
poison pill.53 If this is the performance of the commercial court with
the most takeover experience of any in the world, the Japanese courts
confront a serious challenge.
When I delivered a precursor to this Article at the Symposium in
Tokyo, I commented that assigning to Japanese courts the role of
creating a code, as opposed to applying a legislatively enacted code to
the cases before them, seemed an oddly common law pattern in a legal
system whose roots lie in the civil law. Professor Kanda rightly
rebukes this reliance on formal differences between legal systems,
reminding us that the divergence between different common law
jurisdictions and between different civil law systems may be as large
as the divergence between the two legal systems.54

52

David Pilling, Japanese Boards Adopt US Rules, FIN. TIMES, June 16, 2003, at

1.
53

Chancellor Chandler nicely explains how the Delaware Supreme Court has
managed this dance. Chandler, supra note 29.
54
Hideki Kanda, Comment, this issue.

19

At the Symposium, I also suggested that the abuse-of-rights
doctrine, invoked so broadly by the Japanese courts to protect
expectations of lifetime employment from a statute that as a technical
matter dictates employment-at-will,55 could be used as a model to
develop case law that provides a nonstatutory constraint on the use of
the poison pill to block needed economic change. Professor Kanda
again properly corrects my superficial analysis of Japanese law. My
attraction to the Japanese courts’ experience with the abuse of rights
doctrine was simply the court’s creation of a judicial doctrine that
restricted the operation of a statute that on its face was not restricted,
the functional task the courts will confront in constraining the
operation of the poison pill. Professor Kanda reminds us that what is
important is not the particular judicial doctrine—on reflection, it
seems odd for me to have imagined that the Japanese courts would
import a largely labor law doctrine into company law—but that a
doctrine be available to serve as a vehicle for the effort. As he
suggests, the Commercial Code in sections 280-10 and 280-39(4)
explicitly invites the necessary doctrinal development by providing
that “significantly unfair” stock issuances may be set aside.56
Certainly the term “unfair” is sufficiently empty that it can be filled
with whatever substance the court concludes is appropriate.
I offer a final, and now appropriately tentative, speculation
concerning the development of judicial constraints on the operation of
the poison pill. Recently, the Japanese courts have struck down the
issuance of shares to a bidder favored by target management based on
an assessment that the issuance’s primary purpose was to protect
target management. While the willingness of the courts to strike down
defensive action is encouraging, I believe analysis of motivation will
prove insufficient in Japan, just as it did in Delaware,57 to distinguish
between appropriate and inappropriate defensive tactics.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Commercial Code amendments that in effect authorize
Japanese corporations to adopt a poison pill launch a major economy
on a problematic course made even more difficult because, after some
dozen years of recession, meaningful economic reform now seems to
be taking hold. The market for corporate control holds the promise of
accelerating that recovery by providing a reform vector that is not
constrained by governmental rigidities. The U.S. experience with the
poison pill provides some guidance for that enterprise. Of course, that
guidance will have to be refracted through the prism of Japanese
institutions to be useful, but even one data point is better than none.
From the perspective of an interested academic viewing the Japanese
corporate governance from a distance, it will be fascinating to watch
the poison pill experience replayed in another system. For those of us
who have been critical of how the Delaware courts have dealt with the
poison pill, having a second data point will be extremely interesting.
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